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Abstract
This paper meusures the nature and degrre oj glnbal financial change by studying interest rate difjerentiafs among
OECD cauntries. First, a simple partfolio model illuminates the various determinants of international capita! mobiliry.
The framework is used to deduce the characteristics oj three fundamentally different but artalydcally connected patterns
of ftnancial change: financial integration, asset substitution and monetary integration. Next, the empirical analysis aims
at quantifying these patterns for two regions: the FizWorld and the FlexWorld, which differ as to their exchange rate
commitment. The results are discussed against the background of some dominant institutional changes in the courttries
concerned. T7te policy implications are presented in a monetary policy conflict triang[e.
1. Introduction
During the last two decades the international financial environment has changed dramatically. The
gradual removal of capital controls, the deregulation of financial markets and the advanced
information technology have strongly improved the conditions for international borrowing and
lending in industrial countries. New techniques and instruments have developed and the market
partipicants' attitude towards exploiting arbitrage opportunities has changed. As a result financial
markets have got integrated and capital mobility has been able to reach unprecedented levels.
The economics profession has explored the nature and consequences of increased capital mobility
in a number of ways. The huge volume of studies can be categorized according to object and
method. As to the object of consideration one can discern an institutional approach, a quantity
approach and a price approach'. With respect to the applied method both inductive and deductive
approaches have been adopted.
Inductive studies focus directly on actual developments. On the basis of a ptiori reasoning, data
' We are grateful to Jacques Sijben, Sjak Smulders, L.ans Bovenberg and Theo Nijman for helpful comments on an
earlier version of the paper. Of course the usual disclaimer applies.
Parts of this paper have been presented at the International Symposium on F.conomic Modelling (Athens June 2-4, 1993)




are investigated and generalized into stylized patterns of change. The observed patterns are
described in terms of qualitative features or quantitative indicators. Qualitative research includes
the historical analysis of the transformation of markets, institutions, legislation and policy orien-
tationZ; quantitative research seeks to capture the growth of capital flows and the international
diversification of asset holdings in some broad statistics'.
Deductive studies start with the formulation of a theoretical model in which the degree of
international capital mobility is a central parameter. Assuming high or even perfect mobility an
operational hypothesis is derived and tested against the data. One example of this approach is the
Feldstein-Horioka hypothesis which argues that domestic saving and investment will be less corre-
lated once capital markets become integrated". Another example is the Frankel hypothesis which
translates financial integration into the condition of covered interest rate parity5.
This paper is concerned with the price approach. As to the method it is primarily based upon
deduction, but inductive insights will turn out to be indispensable both in the formulation of the
model and in the interpretation of the results. Our main purpose is to measure the degree of
financial change by studying interest rate differentials across OECD countries. Since interest rates
and exchange rates are strongly interconnected, we divide the OECD-area into two regions. In the
'FixWorld' the authorities participate in a currency arrangement, whereas in the 'FlexWorld'
exchange rates are left free.
The analytical framework of our analysis is presented in section 2. A simple portfolio model
enables us to cluster the various determinants of capital mobility into a price distor[ion parameter,
an adjustment parameter and a substitution parameter. The model is solved for three different
regimes, representing three 'states of the world' with respect to the nature and degree of financial
change. Each regime is translated into a specific hypothesis about the interdependence of national
interest rates. The paper proceeds in section 3 with an empirical analysis of these hypotheses, both
for the FixWorld and the FlexWorld. The results are discussed against the background of some
institutional changes in the countries concerned. Section 4 contains a short note on the policy
implication of our analysis and section 5 concludes.
2. I:rum the numeruus paprr. cuvrring ihi, cumprchensive ticlJ we memiun nIS (1986, p.149-16R), Watson et rrl
(198R, p.35-~39), Briiker (1989). Fulkerts-Landau (1989) anJ OECD (1990).
3. See e.g. Guluh (1990), GulJstein, Mathieson anJ Lrne (I991), "Turner (1991).




Global financial change can manifest itself in different shapes. In this section a portfolio model is
designed in order to illuminate the conceptual distinction between financial integration, asset
substitution and monetary integration. In view of the empirical testing in section 3, it is essential
to be explicit on our interpretation of these three related but different phenomena.
Given the purpose of clarifying the differences between these broad and often confounded con-
cepts, the portfolio framework should be formulated in general terms. For that reason most
equations are deliberately specified in functional forms. Every choice for a more explicit model,
although probably more elegant from a microeconomic point of view, would render the analysis
less general and hence distract from our original aimb.
In the model a representative investor can diversify his financial wealth between two instruments.
One asset is issued at home and denominated in the domestic currency. The other is issued abroad
and expressed in a foreign currency. Hence, the assets differ as to the aspects of currency
denomination and national jurisdiction. Other asset characteristics such as liquidity, term to
maturity and default risk are assumed to be equal. One may think here of govemment bonds or
bank deposits.
In general portfolio decisions will be guided by expected returns, risk perception and environ-
mental factors like legislation, communication systems and market structure. It is useful to
elaborate on this by dividing the investment decision into two steps. The first step deals with the
preferred portfolio and the second one with the actual portfolio'. The preferred portfolio is an
expression of the investor's willingness to hold foreign and domestic assets in a certain proportion.
The actual portfolio also includes the abiliry of the investor to realize his preferences.
The asset demand functions are assumed to be homogeneous in wealth; thus the preferred share of
foreign assets (P~`) and the preferred share of domestic assets (1-P~`) are independent of the level
of financial wealth. With R as the expected return on foreign assets relative to domestic assets and
~p as a substitution parameter we write:
(1) P~` - P~`( c. ~p.R ) 0 S P~` 5 1
0 C c c 1
aP~`I8R 1 0
6. For an clatx~rate survey of the literature on the micro foundations of international portfolio choice see Adler á
Dumas (1983).
7. Cf. Kenen (1976), Akhtar and Weiller (1987), Bovenberg and Goulder (1991).
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In this equation c represents the share of foreign assets in what might be called the minimum risk-
portfolio. The investor will hold more foreign assets (P~` 1 c) only if the expected relative return
on foreign assets is large enough to outweigh the associated rise in the overall portfolio risk".
Subsequently, the extent to which an international return differen[ial induces a shift in the
preferred portfolio depends on the value of the substitution parameter ~p. This parameter captures
the risk~return attitude of the representative investor as a function of his subjective risk aversion
(p) and the objective risk characteristics of the assets concerned. Since the two financial instru-
ments are issued in different currencies and under a different legal jurisdiction, we have to take
account of a currency risk (CUR) and a political risk (POR). For ease of exposition the distinct
risk elements are assumed to be separable and independent from each other. So we write:
(2a) ~p - ~p (p, CUR, POR)
The currency risk results from the fact that the expected future course of the exchange rate (which
is part of R, see below) is subject to uncertainty. The investor incurs a currency risk if he is not
able or not willing to hedge his wealth position fully against the exchange rate variability. A
political risk is involved as the investor faces the possibility that the power of control over his
funds is limited by future exchange restrictions on capital flows9.
In this way risk aversion and risk characteristics together determine the value of the substitution
parameter yo. The larger their product, the lower the degree of substitutability between foreign and
domestic assets. With risk averse investors (p ~ 0) assets are imperfect substitutes (~p G oo) and
a rise, for example, in the relative supply of foreign assets will ceteris paribus be absorbed in the
investor's preferred portfolio, only after the return differential has increased. This increase is
necessary to compensate for the deteriorated risk exposure: it reflects a rise of the required risk
premia.
Next to the perception of a currency and a political risk, our framework also allows for an
autonomous bias in the asset demand function towards domestic instruments. This home asset
8. See Dornbusch (1983) or Bovenberg 8c Goulder (1991, 1993). Dornbusch derives a minimum risk-portfolio in a
model with [wo assets, two goods and a representative agent maximizing his utility as a function of the mean and
variance of end-of-period wealth. The minimum risk-, or more precise, minimum variance-portfolio is determined
by [he relative riskiness of the two assets and is independent from [he risk aversion of the investor. If exchange rate
risk is the only source of re[urn variability, an individual investor can realize a perfect hedge by equating the share
of foreign asset.c in his portfolio to the share of foreign goods in his spending pa[tern.
9. Political risk is detined here in a narrow sense as for example by Aliber (1973). A broader definition is applied by
Buiter (1983). In his analysis political risk covers legal risk (jurisdictional disputes, the introduction of capital
controls), sovereígn risk (associated with adverse political events, such as wars, coups and expropriations) and
policy risk (policy changes influencing the return on a foreign investment including macrceconomic fiscal and
monetary stabilization policy measures).
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preference (HAP) refers to the fact that lending abroad can be hampered by a relatively limited
knowledge of foreign borrowers (according to Akerlofs lemons' principle) or by a lack of
experience with foreign trading practices. But HAP can also be due to some kind of psychological
aversion induced e.g. by an uneasy feeling of not having capital under immediate or nearby
control'~.
Taking all elements together we get:




Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the preferred portfolio P~` and the return differential R
for different values of ~p. As this figure is restricted to the demand side (for the role of supply see
below), the reasoning should go from a given R and a chosen ~p to a resu[ting P~".
pcq~ cm
0 ~R
Figure 1: Asset substitution a~nd the preferred portfolio
lo. The phenomenon of home asset preference is already mentioned by Ricardo: 'Experience ... shows that the fancied
nr renl insecurity of crpítal, when not under the immediate cnntrol of its uwner ... check the emigration of capital.
Thesc frrlinAe induce most men of pruperty tn ix sarlslled with a low rate of protits in their own country, rather
than seek a more advantageous employment for their wealth in foreign nations' (18171ed.1933, p.83; italics ours).
Il. A specific functional form for the demand function as depicted in figure 1 is the logistic specification: P' -
mi(mfeya), in which m equals cl(1-c).
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If there is no substitution between foreign and domestic assets, e.g. because investors are
extremely risk-averse or have an extremely high preference for home assets, demand does not
react to changes in the return differential ( ~p-0). In that case the investor will stick to the
minimum risk-portfolio (P~`-c) whatever the value of R.
At the other extreme, the investor is risk-neutral and unbiased. In that case domes[ic and foreign
assets are perfect substitutes ( ~o -~ oo) and the portfolio distribution alters with the slightest
deviation of the return differential from zero ( thus P~` -1 if R~ 0 and P~` -0 if R G0).
In the intermediate case of imperfect substitution (0 G~p G oo ), the investor outweighs the expected
return differential against the increase in the portfolio risk, before deviating from the minimum
risk portfolio (thus c G P~` G I if R~ 0 and 0 G P~` G c if RG 0). If the expected return differential is
zero, the investor has no incentive to take a'speculative' position in one of both assets; the
preferred shares of the foreign and domestic assets will correspond to their proportions in the
minimum risk portfolio ( P~`-c if R-0).
We now turn to the definition of R and the determination of the actual portfolio P. In both
functions the role of capital controls will be made explicit.
The expected relative return on foreign assets (R) is firstly determined by the foreign interest rate
(i~), the domestic interest rate (i,,) and the expected depreciation rate of the foreign currency during
the investment period (EDEP). ln addition, foreign investment can be discouraged by official price
regulations, which affect the net relative yield on foreign assets. The authorities can announce a
cash deposit requirement on capital outflows; interest payments from abroad can be subjected to
an interest rate ceiling or a withholding tax. This kind of indirect capital controls is taken account
of by the price distortion parameter B. So we arrive at:
(3) R - {i,(I - B) - EDEP~ - i~ 0 5 B G I
Apart from indirect regulations with respect to the flow of funds across national borders, countries
can also resort to direc7 mcasures. Whereas indirect restrictions are cost-based and therefore part
of thc yicld variable R, the impact of direct or quantitative restrictions on capital movements is
quite different.
In a world with direct capital controls investors are not able to bring the actual portfolio (P) in
line with the preferred one immediately. If the monetary authorities impose direct barriers, a
desired change of P will be hampered. Portfolio shifts involve time and resources if agents are to
fulfill the existing procedures or to find ways of evading them. In essence the effect of quantitati-
6
ve capital restrictions has been to delay or preclude capital movements as intended by investors at
a certain moment in time. Hence we write:
(4) AP - a (P~` - P.,) 0 5 a 5 1
The parameter a retlec[s the strength of the regime in force. With ~- 1 capital transactions are
completely free. A change in preferred asset holdings will immediatedly be followed by a change
in actual holdings. Hence P- P~` at any moment in time.
For a C I instantaneous adjustment is not possible. The lower a, the lower the speed of
adjustment. In the extreme case of c~ - 0 capital restrictions are prohibitive and P cannot respond
to P~` at all. Figure 2 depicts the dynamic adjustment path of P, given P~` and P.,, for different
values of a.
[n more general terms a can be seen as a broad indicator of the financial environment in which
lenders and borrowers operate. This not only includes the extent to which direct capital controls
are restrictive, but it also refers to other environmental factors, such as the efficiency of the
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Figure 2: Capital barrieis and the actual portfolio
In summary, the semi-reduced form of the model is:
(5) P- P(i~ - ia; B, a, to, EDEP, c, P.,)
The interest rate differential can be solved if the model is extended with an asset supply function.
In the next section we will assume that the supply of domestic and foreign assets is exogenous.
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Under such circumstanccs eyuatiun (5) can be usecJ to deduce a number of parity conditions,
dexcrihing threc different rcgimes of the international economy: Fnancial integration, asset sub-
stitution and monetary integration. The regimes differ as to the attached values of B, a, ~p and
EDEP.
Regime 1: Financial Integration
We define financial integration as a process by which all environmental obstacles to asset trade
disappear. This process is quite comprehensive. It demands a liberalisation of capital movements
implying that residents become free to lend or to borrow abroad and non-residents to have access
to the domestic financial market. Also indirect controls disappear. It further requires a globalisati-
on of the communication system which means that information is quickly and cheaply available to
all market participants. It finally includes the development of international markets with high
absorption capacity and transparant transaction procedures.
In our model financial integration primarily influences the adjustment parameter a. As soon as the
process of liberalisation and internationalisation has been completed, the financial sector can be
labeled as fully integrated. Perfect capital mobility implies that a will be unity; the actual portfolio
adjusts instantaneously to a change in the preferred portfolio composition. Besides, the price dis-
tortion parameter B will be affected: for perfect financial integration B needs to be zero.
If the authorities' action of lifting capital controls is credible, the political risk of holding foreign
assets (POR) will undoubtly diminish. So, as financial integration proceeds we might expect the
POR-premium to disappear and the degree of substitutability between foreign and domestic assets
(~p) to rise. However, the decision to diversify internationally can still be hampered by a domestic
bias in the agents' utility function. Moreover, any purchase of foreign assets still entails a cur-
rency risk. Hence we conclude that, even in a world of perfect capital mobility the substitution
parameter ~o will remain finite.
If we take everything together, perfect integration means that our model can be reduced to:
(6) P - P~` - P (R', ~y')
with
(2') R' - {i~ - EDEP} - i~
and
(3') ~p' - ~p'(p.CUR, HAP)
S
In equilibrium, given the relative supply of assets, not only the expected depreciation rate but also
the perceived currency risk and the autonomous home asset preference are priced. Hence,
substituting (2') and (3') in (6) implies that the interest rate differential can be written as:
(7) i~ - ia - EDEP t CUR-premium -~ HAP-premium
In section 3 we will dicuss how (7) can be translated into an operational hypothesis and show
whether or not this hypothesis is supported by actual developments.
Regime 2: Asset Substitution
In a financially integrated world domestic and foreign assets can remain imperfect substitutes. To
proceed to a world of perfect substitutability, it is necessary that investors:
(i) lose their risk aversion (p -~ 0, hence POR-premium -~ 0 and CUR-premium -~ 0)
and
(i) lose their systematic preference for home issued securities (HAP-premium -~ 0).
Only if both conditions are fully met the substitution parameter will become infinite. In terms of
our model perfect asset substitution presupposes not only a- I and B- 0, but also ~p - ~ oo . In
such circumstances the actual portfolio is completely elastic to the expected return differential:
(8) P - P~` - P(R', ~oo)
With investors both able and eager to exploit all investment opportunities, the slightest return
differential provokes a demand surplus in the market for the higher-yielding asset and a supply
surplus in the market for the low-yielding asset. Hence, in equilibrium the expected returns on
foreign and domestic assets will be equalized. This arbitrage-process results in uncovered interest
parity (R'-0, or):
(9) i~ - id - EDEP
Many textbooks use the uncovered interest parity condition (9) to typify perfect capital mobili-
ty12. This implies that instantaneous adjustment and asset substitution are not interpreted as
different phenomena. Indeed, in a theoretical world with perfect foresight or without uncertainty,
equation (7) and (9) are identical. In our more empirical approach however, we prefer to draw a
12. See e.g. Dornbusch (1980, p.176).
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distinetion between the concepts of mobility and substitution, retteciiug ihe ability resr„ctive!y thP
willingness of investors to diversify their portfolios internationally".
Regime 3: Monetary lntegration
The third regime we would like to present refers to the process of monetary integration which
should clearly be distinguished from financial integration. Whereas the latter is a dominant trend
in all industrial countries, the former is confined to the European Community. Ever since its
foundation a high priority has been given to the stabilisation of bilateral exchange rates. By parti-
cipating in a formal exchange rate mechanism (Bretton Woods, the Snake, the EMS) European
countries have always sought to establish a zone of monetary stability, be it with a varying degree
of success, in order to stimulate intra-trade, investment and prosperity.
We define monetary integration as the combination of financial integration and the gradual disap-
pearance of exchange rate changes. This process starts as soon as national authorities decide to
peg the external value of their currencies to a common anchor without relying on capital controls.
If this commitment is credible exchange rate fluctuations can diminish and ultimately even
disappear. An important condition in this respect is the close coordination of macrceconomic
policies among the participating countries. For, if expected inflation differentials have not been
eliminated, sooner or later the process of monetary integration will lose momentum.
We will call monetary integration perfect if capital controls have been abolished ànd market parti-
cipants no longer expect the bilateral exchange rates to change at all. The sustainability of such an
arrangement requires a high degree of policy convergence. With free capital movements one might
even argue that a permanent locking of exchange rates with no margin of fluctuations, requires
monetary policy to be completely centralized and fiscal policy to be strongly harmonized". In
such a situation, which can be interpreted as a de facto currency union, both EDEP and CUR
have lost their role. So equation (7) can be reduced to:
(10) it - id - HAP-premium
Neither capital controls (a, B, POR), nor exchange rate expectations (EDEP) and exchange rate
uncertainty (CUR) can drive a wedge between the nominal interest rates of the countries
concerned. In that case arbitrage in the financial markets ensures the equalisation of nominal
returns, unless home asset preferences (HAP) prevent domestic and foreign assets from being
13. For other ways to distinguish between tinancial inlegration anJ asset substitWion see Kenen (1976, p.20) or Goluh
(1990, p.4~5). Lemmen anJ Eijflinger (1993) speak of capital mobility type I and capital mohiliry type 2.
14. F;C ( I 9ix))
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perfect substitutes's
Summary of regime defii:itions
In summary we may conclude that financial integration, asset substitution and monetary integrati-
on differ fundamen[ally as to their nature and characteristics. But it has also become clear that the
three 'worlds' are analytically connected by the fact that the underlying assumptions have an
increasing order of specificity. Scheme 1 summarizes how the various elements of our regime
definitions are related.
SCHEME 1: Regime definitions
Perfect Finan- Perfect Asset Perfect Monetary
cialIntegration Substitution Integration
Assumptions Symbols
No regulatory bar- a- 1 ~ ~ ~
riers B- 0
No political risk p.CUR - 0 ~ ~ ~
premium
No systematic home HAP - 0 ~
asset preference
No currency risk p.CUR - 0 ~ ~
premium
Stable exchange rate EDEP- 0 ~
expectations
15. If home asset preferences are absent regime 3 might be interpreted as a special cxse of regime 2: perfect
substitutability with EDEP - 0 as an additional requirement. However, there is a subde difference: perfect sub-
sti[u[ability under regime 2 relies on the assumption that investors are neutral or inditTerent towards currency risks
(p - 0). In the extreme case of perfrr~ monetary convergence under regime 3, there is no currency risk premium
because Ihere is no ezchange rate uncertaiuty left (CUR - 0).
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3. Empirical implementation and resWts
We now turn to the issue of quantifying the historical pattern of financial change in the OECD
area. To this end the parity conditions (7), (9) and (10), each referring to another regime, will be
translated into a set of aggregate dispersion measures. Each measure captures the mean absolute
deviation from interest rate parity for a group of countries against a common reference rate1ó. In
generaL
n
1(12) ADM~ - - ~ ~ ij.t - (tref.t - COR,) ~n ~z~
with ADM, - aggrega[e dispersion measure at moment t
n - number of countries
i~., - domestic interest rate of country j at moment t
ircF., - reference rate at moment t
COR, - regime correction term
Depending on the regime under consideration the reference rate has to be adjusted for exchange
rate expectations andlor risk premia. The derived parity conditions prescribe which elements
should be included in the regime correction term (COR). Subsequently some additional assumpti-
ons are necessary to make the dispersion measure operational. In scheme 2 the empirical
implementation of each regime has been summarized. Basically, financial integration is measured
by covered interest rate parity, asset substitution by uncovered interest rate parity and monetary
integration by nominal interest rate parity.
Under the hypothesis of perfect financial integration a bilateral interest rate differential can only
be attributed to currency factors (EDEP, CUR-premium) andlor to home-asset preference (HAP-
premium). The correction term should therefore include these elements, but the problem is that
none of them is directly observable. Our solution is to confine the analysis to short term yields
which enables us to replace the currency factors by the forward discount on foreign currency".
In fact we then suppose investors to hedge against any exchange rate change which makes the
16. In designing this multinational statistic we were inspired by Kasman and Pigott (1988). Their reference rate
however is a'world' interest rate, artificially constructed as the simple average of the interest rates prevailing in
the countries of their sample. Besides they do not make a difference between countries with (managed) Floating
exchange rates and countries participating in a fixed exchange rate mechanism as we will do further onwards.
17. In this we follow Frankel (1986 and 1989).
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(certain) return on foreign assets equal to i,rt minus the forward discount. iaking in ihis way the
covered return differential as an indicator for financial segmentation we are left with one
additional assumption i.c. the absence of a home asset preference. Because of the transparancy of
money markets (relative to that of bond and equity markets) this neglect of a possible HAP-
premium seems acceptable.
SCHEME 2: Aggregate dispersion measures for three regimes of financial change'".
Regime 1: Financial Integration
COR: EDEP f CUR-premium -t- HAP-premium
OA: EDEP and CUR-premium replaced by the forward discount (FD) of the





Regime 2: Asset Substitution
COR: EDEP
OA: EDEP replaced by the actual depreciation (DEP) of the reference currency
against the domestic currency during the investment period.
n
ADM: 1~ ~ ij -(i,~t - DEPret.j) ~n j:t
Regime 3: Monetary Integration
COR: HAP-premium
OA: HAP-premium neglected.
ADM: I tj - tretl
18. COR - regime correction term, OA - operational assumption(s), ADM - aggregate dispersion measure.
To simplify the notation time-indices have lxen suppressed.
13
For the other regimes the correctton term is treated analugousiy. In rcgi~;.;. 2 the refrer.ce ra[e
ha. lu he adjus[eil liir lhe expectetl depreciatiun rale uf the foreign currency. Using rational
expectations as the operational assumption, the hypothesis of perfect substitutability comes down
to the ex post equaliTation of returns across countries except for a random error term which re-
flects the unexpected change of the exchange rate19. Finally, in regime 3 the correction term only
includes a HAP-premium, which we neglect for the same reason as mentioned under regime 1.
The ADM's presented in scheme 2, are calculated for two regions, labeled FixWor[d and
FlexWorld. The countries of the FixWorld have participated in the exchange rate mechanism of
the EMS for a prolonged period of time. The FlexWorld-countries are not tied by official
obligations neither to intervene in the foreign exchange markets, nor to adapt domestic interest
rates in response to exchange market pressures. Although they may have pursued a policy
managed floating their commitment is rather weak. Given this ex ante subdivision of our sample
the availability of data limits the number of countries to six for the FlexWorld and six for the
FixWorldm.
Fixworld: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands.
Flexworld: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States.
All ADMs are calculated on a monthly basis; the observation period is 197313-1993I11; data are
taken from the DATASTREAM International Database. The domestic interest rates (i~) are
predominantly three month ( interbank) deposit rates; the reference rate (4 ~r) is a three month Eu-
ro~rate for the FlexWorld and a three month EuroDMrate for the FixWorld. Since Eurocurrency
markets are virtually free from reserve requirements, withholding taxes and other regulations, the
use of a Euro-rate as the common point of reference garantees that for each j the ( covered) ADM
isolates as much as possible the effect of capital controls in the country concerned.
The patterns of financial change, condensed ín six ADMs, are plotted in graph 1, 2 and 3 and will
be discussed successively21.
19. As a consequence the empirical investigation of this regime implies the testing of a joint hypothesis. This problem
will be discussed later on.
20. Germany is included in both Worlds; this country is assumed to represent the floating of the FixWorld-block within
the FlexWorld.
21. Bars on the horizontal axis refer to mid year estimates unless indicated otherwise.
14
Regime 1: Financial Iretegration.
The ADMs of Graph I show the mean absolute deviation from covered interest parity within the
FlexWorld and the FixWorid. Remaining yield differentials reflect regulatory obstacles to
arbitrage, especially capital controls and political risk premia~. If, in other words the covered
ADM is high, there is little reason to accept the hypothesis of perfect financial integration.
Capital controls are basically a policy instrument to shelter the domestic economy from potentially
destabilising capital flows. As a tool of exchange rate management they are called upon to offset
short term market pressure. More important perhaps, in countries with a strong exchange rate
commitment the restrictions offer the policymakers some autonomy over the domestic money
supply or the domestic interest rate, at least in the short run.
In the early seventies (1970-1973), Japan and the European countries relied heavily on capital
controls. Nevertheless, they were unable to stem the huge capital inflows from the United States.
When the failure of the Smithsonian Agreement put an end to the Bretton Woods System the
larger countries resorted to individual floating, while the countries of the European Community
decided to block floating, first within the Snake, later within the EMS. The pattern displayed by
the covered ADMs in Graph l corresponds closely to the gradual liberalisation of capital
movements since then23.
F[ezWorld
In the FlexWorld-countries the ADM drops quickly after the transition to floating exchange rates
in the beginning of the 1970s. In 1974 the United States and Canada liberalised capital outflows
while Germany, Japan and Australia relaxed the restrictions on capital inflows~. There were
several driving forces behind this development. As the stabilization of the exchange rate became a
less binding policy objective, the need for capital controls as an additional instrument to maintain
control over the domestic monetary situation seemed to diminish. For some countries another
motive for liberalising capital inflows was the weakened balance of payments position after the
first oil crisis.
This early liberalisation trend did not persist very long. The behaviour of the ADM during the
second half of the 1970s fits in with the reintroduction of capital controls by Germany, Switzer-
land and Australia. In Japan the application of restrictions responded in a consistent way to the
22. The role of transaction costs and data imperfections will be discussed Iater on.
23. For the deregulation of international transactions and the driving forces behind the liberalisa[ion process, see e.g.
Lamfalussy (1981, p. 194-203), Van den Bergh (1987), OECD (1990, p. 32-47) and Van Gemert 8c Gruijters
(1992).
24. Due to the limited availability of data Japan and Australia enter the analysis not before February 1977 respectively
March 1977.
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GRAPH 1: Financial iníegïatiur~
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posi[ion of the current account~. With a growing sutpius in 197? net t~.pital i nfloevs wPre
discouraged, but after a deterioration of the current account in 1979, the Japanese policymakers
reversed the controls and stimulated net inflows.
A second, more comprehensive and lasting wave of financial integration in the FlexWorld started
in 1979. In the United Kingdom the free market philosophy of the Thatcher administration gave
new impetus to the liberalisation process. Within a few months all British capital controls were
abolished. Thereupon the second oil crisis induced the abolition of the remaining restrictions on
capital inflows in Germany. In 1980 new legislation in Japan changed the system of capital
regulations fundamentally, but it took severe political pressure, exerted by the United States in
1984, before the Japanese government made serious commitments to liberalise capital flows and to
facilitate the access of non-residents to the domestic financial markets. In December 1983
Australia abolished almost all restrictions on capital flows. This liberalisation was the result of a
policy switch to free floating, after a decade of pegging the Australian dollar to a currency basket.
Finally, during 1984 the United States, Germany and Japan repealed their withholding taxes on
interest payments to non-residents.
These regulatory changes are accompanied by a sharp decrease in both the level and the volatility
of the aggregate dispersion measure during the first half of the 1980s. This behaviour indicates
that the speed of financial integration was high. By now the mean covered interest differential has
been less than 0.5 percent for a decade or soZb. Hence we do not hesitate to conclude that the
process of financial integration in the FlexWorld was completed in the mid 1980s.
FixWorld
In general, the differences between the Fixworld and the FlexWorld are striking. First of all,
interest rate differentials in the FixWorld have lasted for a rather long period; in fact they continu-
25. See Argy ( 1982, p. 46-54) and Ito ( 1986).
26. At first glance, a level of t50 basispoinóc for the ADM since 19831'84, might seem high for integrated financial
markets. One should realize however that [his deviation does not imply automatically an unexploited net profit
opportuniry for two reasons. First, the arbitrager faces transaction costs in the spot exchange market, the forward
marke[, and in the deposit markets. Estimates of the transactions costs differ. Keynes (1924, p. 128) suggested for
example: "..such amount (say ~ per cent) wiU yietd the arbitragers sufftcient profit for their trouble.". Frenkel 8c
Levich(1981) come up with estimates ranging between 48 and 59 basispoints for transac[ion costs in the USS~f
currency market. Their method is critized for overestimating the actual costc, see e.g. McCormick ( 1979). As there
are no capital controls nor differences in political risk in one financial centre, covered interest rate disparities
within Eurocurrencymarkets may serve as a crude inditator of transactions costs for a round trip. For example in
our da[a-set, the mean absolute deviation for the Eurodollar- and the EuroDMmarket is 22 basispoints in the period
1973-1993. The second reason for remaining deviations are imperfections in the data-set: ideally, the monthly
observations for the spot rate, the forward rate and the interest rates should be made within the same minute,
because all transactions involved in arbitrage can be made within secottds. To our krrowledge there are no data-
sources that can garantee for a sample of eleven countries over a period of twenry years, such a high level of
accuracy. Therefore, part of the differentials are to be attributed to time-lags between the observations for the
interest rates and the exchange rates.
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ed unabated until 19891'90. Second, the AUM of the FixJJoriti itu~iuaies at a reiativ~ly high .:,ve;
and also exhibits a relatively high volatility. Those observations indicate a lesser degree of finan-
cial integration for much of the observation period. We consider this result quite comprehensive
as it represents the extensive and discretionary use of capital controls by countries with an explicit
exchange rate objective.
The early decrease in the ADM of the FixWorld corresponds to the relaxation of capital
restrictions by Germany, the Netherlands and France in 19741'7~. This drop, however, was
only incidental. France and [taly reversed their control systems: these countries liberalised inflows
but regulated outflows in response to the deterioration of the external position. Other countries,
too, maintained or re-introduced parts of the control system during both the Snake-period and the
turbulent starting period of the EMS.
In the early stages of the EMS there was a discrepancy in the use of controls. Germany and The
Netherlmtds liberalised capital flows in 1981, while the 'weak currency' countries, viz. France,
Italy, Belgium and Derunark, regulated capital outflows. This discrepancy is often interpreted as a
consequence of the asymmetric functioning of the EMS~. In this view the 'anchor' country
Germany determines the monetary policy stance of the entire system, while the 'periphery' coun-
tries align their policy to defend the exchange rate~. However, the weak currency countries did
not wish to refrain completely from domestic policy objectives and tried to stabilise the exchange
rate with capital controls.
In practice, the regulations offered them only a modest degree of monetary sovereignty: in time,
the financial markets devised new instruments and new methods to avoid the regulations~. These
financial innovations forced the policy maker either to accept the discipline of the exchange rate
mechanism and adapt its policy, or to extend the control system continuously. Nevertheless, in the
short run the controls could be effective in breaking the link between the domestic and the foreign
interest rate; the restrictions became especially binding on capital outflows in períods of turmoil,
as the financial markets anticipated an exchange rate realignment. This seems to explain the high
volatility of the ADM in the wake of EMS-realignments".
The controls were unable to prevent realignments. The devaluations in the early stages of the
EMS did not improve the current account balance of the 'weak currency'-countries. The frequency
27. At the same time, Denmark and Italy liberalized capital inFlows, but [hey are not included in Ihe ADM until
lanuary 1976 respectively ]anuary 1977, because of the limited availabiliry of data.
28. For this interpreta[ion see e.g. Giovannini (1989).
29. For a discussion see Gros Be Thygesen (1992, p. 136-I50).
30. See e.g. Wihlborg (1982).
31. In a more detailed empirical analysis Giavazzi óc Pagano (1988, p. 270-278) draw the conclusion that the French
comrols were effective in both perinds of' EMS-turmoil and EMScalm, while the Italian controls were only able to
drive a wedge Ixtween the Jomestic rate and the 'nffshore' rate hefnre EMS realignments.
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of the realignmen[s harmed the reputation of [he poiicy~uakcrs and sparked inflationar;~ expecta-
tions. Eventually, they abandoned discretionary domestic policies and gave priority to stabilising
the exchange rate according to the asyrnmetric functioning of the EMS.
[n Denmark, a new elected conservative administration radically changed the course of its
exchange rate policy in October 1982. A firm exchange rate objective, supported by a tight fiscal
policy and wage guidelines, turned out to be more successful in reducing the domestic interest
rate'Z. As the exchange rate policy gained more credibility, Denmark was able to relax its capital
regulations substantially in the period 19831'86.
In the second half of the eighties, the relatively favorable economic developments and the internal
market program of the European Commission carried the liberalisation process even further. After
the removal of the most important capital controls by the Chirac administration in 19861'87,
France complied wi[h [he European directives concerning the liberalisation of capital movements.
Italy followed the French example at short distance. An improvement of the external balance
provided the opportunity to dismantle the capital restrictions gradually. The new foreign exchange
law of January 1988 changed the Italian control system fundamentally, although some rules for
short-term transactions remained in force.
Since July 1990 the provisions of the EC-directives ensuring the freedom of capital flows are
incorporated in the legislation of the member states. Indeed, as reflected by the low level of the
ADM, capital movements were hardly impeded at the end of the decade. We conclude that next to
the Flexworld also the FixWorld can nowadays be characterised as a region of perfect financial
integration.
Regime 2: Asset Substitution
Financial integration does not automatically imply perfect substitutability. As elaborated above,
the hypo[hesis of perfect substitution imposes both the absence of regulatory barriers ànd a general
indifference of the representative investor in his choice to hold foreign or domestic assets: he is
neither afflicted with a home asset preference nor does he perceive any currency or political risks.
Only under these conditions will interest arbitrage ensure ex-ante uncovered interest rate parity.
The empirical ímplementation of this condition runs up against a serious problem. As explained in
scheme 2 we have to assume rational exchange rate expectations. Hence, the analysis of this
regime is hampered by the inescapability of a joint hypothesis: ex post uncovered interest rate
differentials can be the result of time varying risk-premia (including a home asset preference)
29. See Andersen 8c Risager (1988, p.674-678).
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andlor the release of new information'~.
Graph 2 presents the mean absolute deviation from uncovered interest parity within the FlexWorld
and the FixWorld. The covered dispersion measure is included too. As explained the distance
between the uncovered ADM and the covered ADM can be due to imperfect asset substitution
andlor to expectational errors. Both ADMs display a remarkably different pattern. In the
FlexWorld, the uncovered return differential fluctuates strongly around a high mean throughout the
whole sample period. It seems reasonable to attribute this to the uncertainty about the future
course of the bilateral exchange rates against the USS. Undoubtedly this uncertainty gives rise to
both substantial risk premiums and to non-negligible errors in the prediction of exchange rates~.
In the FixWorld both the level and the volatility of the aggregate dispersion measure is far below
its counterpart in the FlexWorld'S. The proclaimed efforts of the authorities to achieve stable
exchange rates are likely to be responsible for this result. Moreover, this region seems to have
experienced an increasing substitutability of assets during the 1980s, but this process was abruptly
reversed in the eve of the EMS-crisis of September 1992. We conclude that, not only conceptually
but also empirically, financial integration and asset substitution are very different phenomena. On
the other hand the analysis strongly suggests that asset substitutability should be seen in relation to
the prevailing exchange rate system. We therefore consider this regime as an intermediate case
and precede quickly to the regime of monetary integration.
Regime 3: Monetary Integration
We see monetary integration as the combination of financial integration and exchange rate
stability. Graph 3 depicts the mean absolute deviation from nominal interest parity as an aggregate
measure of monetary integration in the FlexWorld and the FixWorld. Since the nominal interest
33. See e.g. Boughton (1988, p. 12-14) for an overview of the empirical literature on uncovered interest pariry. An
alternative to the rational expectations hypothesis is the use of survey~ata on exchange rate expectations of market
participants. The use of these data is however, severely critized, see for example Hodrick (1987) and Koedijk 8c
Ott (1987): the market participants would not have an incentive to reveal their true ezpectation; besides, the
average ezpectation of the survey might not contain useful information on the future course of the spot rate as the
agen[s with extreme expecta[ions are those who will take speculative posi[ions and drive [he spot rate.
34. In the literature, considerable effort has been dedicated to modeling and estimating the exchange risk premium. The
results are mixed; although there are empirical indications for the existence of a time-varying risk premium (see
e.g. Fama (1984)), it [urns out to be impossible to obtain estimates of the premium that can explain the magnitude
of [he uncovered interest rate differentials. See e.g. Boothe dc Longworth (1986) and Frankel (1988). Other
empirical studies using survey-data on exchange rate expectations, e.g. Ito (1990) and Frankel 8c Froo[ (1990),
point to the presence of large and systematic expectation errors. Explanations for this apparent irrational behavior
of economic agents within the paradigm of rationali[y, range from the 'peso'-problem to speculative 'bubbles'.
35. This conclusion corresponds to the results of Ayuso 8r Restoy (1992, p. 24-25): "... Evaluation of the risk premia
highlights the notable difference between the risk run on investing in ERM currencies and in those of non-ERM
members. ...deposits in dollars and yen thus incorporate substantial risk premia, while those associated with [he D-
mark, the French franc, the lira, the peseta and, to a lesser extent (owing to its later membership of the ERM),
sterling are on a much more moderate scale ...".
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rRAPH 3: Monetarv Integration
FlexWorld







3r73 I'75 I'77 I '79 I'81 I'83 I'85 1'87 I'89 I'91 I 11r93
74 '76 '78 '80 '82 '84 '86 '88 '90 '92










3j'7374 75'767778'79~80 81 '82'~'84,~'86~87
~'89.90'91 ~9211 r93
Nomfnal ADM ~ Covered ADM o Realignment
rates are readily available the calcuiation oï [he ADfvís ui,es nui réiy on any ~pe:atiana: ass;:mpti-
on.
The covered ADMs of Graph l are replotted here in cirder to get a complete picture. We recall
that the distance t~c~tween the nominal and the cuvered ADM encompasses two elements:
(i) the expected exchange rate changes against the USá (for the FlexWorld countries) or
against the DM (for the FixWorld countries), and
(ii) the uncertainty surrounding these expectations.
As to the F1exWorld it dces not come as a surprise that the nominal ADM lacks a clear downward
trend. In general, the low priority given to exchange rate stability and to international policy
coordination, has given the economic agents little reason to assume constant exchange rates. At
times the dominance of internal objectives pushed short term interest rates in different directions.
This asymmetry made bilateral exchange rates rather volatile which in turn pushed expectations
and feeded uncertainty. The high volatility of the nominal interest rate differentials in the period
1979~'82 coincides with the change in the operating procedures of the Federal Reserve in the US.
Since then, the ADM has fluctuated around a level of approximately 3 percent per annum. The
last upsurge in interest rate dispersions dates back to 1991~'92 and can be attzibuted to a divergent
monetary policy stance in the United States and Germany. In short, although the abolition of
capital controls per se has caused interest rates to converge, this tendency has apparently been
offset by the impact of policy disparities on exchange rate behaviour.
Again, the pattern for the FixWorld is quite different. During the Snake-period (197214-1979~3)
the European countries did not live up to their exchange rate commitment very seriously. Several
countries abandoned the arrangement and the system experienced five realignments within a period
of two years (1976I10-1978I10)36. In the early 1980s, however, the nominal ADM started to
decline and a gradual but consistent decrease could take place. Clearly financial integration went
hand in hand with monetary convergence. At the time of the Maastricht Treaty (1992I12) the
aggregate dispersion measure was less than 0.5. This reflects that free capital movements were
accompanied by a virtually complete stabilisation of exchange rate expectations.
This downward trend in the nominal ADM is undoubtedly related to the disciplinary effect
associated with the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. Initially the system tnainly survived
thanks to capital controls and realignments. Subsequently the main characteristics became
36. The United Kingdom left the snake in 1972l6; Denmark also in 197216, but it re-entered in 1972I10; Italy left the
snake in 197312; France abandoned the system in 197411, but re-entered in 1975r7. After eight months France
recurred to floating again in 197613. Sweden left the snake in 197718 and Norway in 1978112. In the end Germany,
the Benelux and Denmark were the only participants.
23
,~ cra,~~atlo,-i anu canve; t,;.c~.'. '-- ' ~ g R4embe. ,,.,,.ntr.es adcpted .. st3b:lttj, nriented pnlicy. The need fnr
realignments virtually disappeared and to the extent that the authorities gathered reputation, could
interest rate differentials could gradually be reduced.
The actual cunvergence of monetary policies and inFlation rates achieved under the EMS, has been
remarkablc but not cumplele". By now it is generally accepted that the observed pattern of
monetary integration in the FixWorld also originates from a growing confidence of the financial
markets in the prospects tiir convergence. The liberalisation of capital flows, [he run of success in
the stabilization uf exchange rates and the perspective of a fully-fledged monetary union made
markets euphoric. Institutional investors were tempted to shift their portfolios from hard-currency
markets to other markets, including the outer fringe of the EC38.
The rise of the ADM in the middle of 1992 reveals that the transition to a world of perfect
monetary integration was suddenly interrupted. Markets' optimism broke down in response to the
coincidence of a number of even[s: political problerns with the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty, a contractive monetary policy stance in unified Germany and a deteriorating economic
outlook in most other member states. With twu currency crises and a widening of the tluctuation
margins exchange rate uncertainty and ins[able expectations have resurged. This accounts for a
considerable wedge between the bilateral interest rates of the FixWorld countries at the end of the
observation period.
37. See De Grauwe (1992), who points out that the convergence of inFlation rates in the EMS was accompanied by a
divergence of price levels. He therefore warns that the erosion of competitiveness of countries like Italy and Spain
will lead to devaluations and, as a result to a setback in the European integration process.
38. See Vliegenthan (1993) and GIO (1993), p.24-25 and p.76-77.
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4. Financiai cnange :utu iilC niuiietá;y Ëa:ic3~ dilcr.u na
The implication of financial change for [he scope of monetary policy is depicted in Figure 3'`'.
The inconsistency between perfect capital mobilily, fixed exchange rates and domestic monetary
policy autonomy implies that countries can combine only two of these items. In a world of perfect
financial integration this conflicting situation forces countries to choose a position somewhere on
the horizontal axis of the [riangle.
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Fignre 3: The conflict triangle of monetary policy
In short, the post-Bretton Woods history of financial change in the OECD-area can be seen as a
transition process which has pushed countries from the top of the triangle to the bottom line. The
FixWorld countries, aiming at a zone of monetary stability in western Europe, have chosen to
follow a route near to the 'fixed exchange rate' axis. In principle this implies a loss of domestic
autonomy. Because of the desire to rnaintain at least some autonomy, during much of the Snake
and EMS-period the distance to both the 'fixed exchange rate' axis and the 'financial in[egration'
39. Cf. the monetary policy triangle in Oxelheim (1990, p.10) and EC (1990, p.43). See also lager (1991, p. 475):
"...With the advance of financial liberalisation and the concomitant ou[burst of interna[ional financial flows, the so-
called ' international incompatible trinity' has become topical...'
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axis was considerabie. Fiuctuaiion margins, ïeáiigru-~ter~is, tilc ~pti~n ~f leaving t:::, syst.o.m and
(until shortly) the use of capital controls have always been part of the system.
The Maastricht Treaty was an attempt to pn~ceed to the very right hand corner of the triangle. In
that corner the combination of fully liberalised capital movements and irrevocably fixed exchange
rates makes divergent policies of demand management no longer feasible at all: monetary
integration has become perfect and monetary policy is completely restricted by the external con-
straint. The apparent or perceived unwilligness of inember countries to accept this consequence
has contributed much to the interruption of the monetary integration process in 1992.
For [he F[e.YWorld countries the followed route is situated near to the 'domestic autonomy' axis,
taking only some distance in ad-hoc periods when exchange rate management got priority.
Although capital mobility increased and even became perfect the floating exchange rate leaves the
authorities much room to base their policies on domestic considerations. Surely, policy induced
exchange rate tluctuations can affect internal objectives like inflation, production and employment.
This external transmission channel undoubtedly complicates the design of a proper policy. But,
since a floating exchange rate accounts for an imperfect substitutability of foreign and domestic
assets, there is ample room to use the interest rate as an instrument to target nominal spending.
26
4. ~U111"ÍtIJIVnJ
By distinguishing the various determinants of international portfolio diversification, we have been
able to define three related but different patterns of financial change. Empirical results were
obtained by calculating a multinational statistic capturing the adjusted interest rate differentials
across national money markets. OECD-countries were pooled into two samples, one representing
the region with floating exchange rates and the other referring to the EMS. Our main findings are:
~` During the last two decades direct capital controls and indirect price regulations have been
used extensively as instruments [o isolate the domestic from the foreign market. The gradual
disappearence of these institutional barriers is called financial integration. In the F1exWorld
perfect financial integration was reached in two steps, one around 1974 and one around t982.
Since then the deviations from covered interest rate parity have been small. In the FixWorld
financial integration was only completed in the late 1980s. This relatively slow pace of capital
liberalisation is due to the EMS-authorities' initial attempt to preserve some monetary
sovereignty.
~` Instantaneous adjustment does not automatically imply perfect substitution. With free capital
movements the investors' willingness to buy foreign assets is conditional on their risk
perception. Notably currency risks and a home asset preference can prevent expected yields
from being equalized cotnpletely. The deviations from uncovered interest rate parity suggest
that asset substi[utability has increased only in the FixWorld. However, our analysis was
hampered hy the operational assumption ul' rational exchange rate expectations.
~` lnterest rates are strongly interconnected with exchange rate expectations. In the FlexWorld
these expectations and the associated currency risk premiums cause nominal rates to diverge
considerably. For the FixWorld the deviations from nominal interest rate parity have diminis-
hed significantly in the years 1982192. The combination of financial integration and (percei-
ved) monetary convergence accounts for this result. Since mid-1992 the turmoil in the EMS
has caused a rnarked reversion of the aggregate dispersion measure.
~` Financia! change has strong implications for the scope of monetary policy. In the FixWorld the
combination of free capital movements and fixed exchange rates is incompatible with the
desire to maintain domestic monetary policy autonomy. In the FlexWorld the combination of
free capital movements and domestic policy autonomy is incompatible with exchange rate
stability. Since there is no way back to the reintroduction of capital controls authorities have to
live with this dilemma.
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